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I. INTRODUCTION

The regulation of health care has traditionally been the province of the
states, most often grounded in the police power. In Colonial times, this division of
responsibility was a rational response to the technological level of the eighteenth
century, although even in the youth of the Republic some health and safety
regulation required national and international action. With the growth of distancecompression technology, the increase in mobility of goods and services, and a
significant federal financial role in health care, the grip of the police power on the
regulation of health care has been weakened. Discussion of the police power is
enjoying something of a renaissance,1 which motivates this attempt to track the
interaction of health care, technology and federalism.
This article first examines the historical regulation of health care as a
police power, and thus, primary state regulatory jurisdiction. Part III is a survey of
the modem landscape of federal regulation of health care under the Spending
Power and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The nature of
technology to compress distance and to permit increased mobility and the resulting
effects on health care and federalism are described in Part IV. Part V examines
several arenas of conflict between technology and regulation of health care,
including e-health, privacy, portability of nurse licensure, medical error reporting,
Internet pharmacies, ERISA preemption, and genomics. Finally, the conclusion
makes some observations regarding the future of health care regulation in our
federal system.
I

See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72

TEMPLE L. Rv. 673 (1999); Richard A. Epstein, Law, Economics, and Social Conservatism: Externalities
Everywhere?: Morals and the Police Power, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 61 (1997); Alan N. Greenspan,
The ConstitutionalExercise of the FederalPolice Power: A FunctionalApproach to Federalism, 41 VAND."
L. REv. 1019 (1988); Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: Some Observations
for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511 (2000); Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the
Regulation of Medical Practice:A HistoricalReview and Guide for Medical Licensing BoardRegulation of
Physiciansin ERISA-Qualified ManagedCare Organizations,8 ANN. HEALTH L. 201 (1999).
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II.

A.

THE COLONIAL ETHOS OF STATE HEALTH REGULATION

Health Careand the PolicePower
1.

The Police Power

The phrase "police power" is not found in the Constitution, but is
frequently employed in constitutional jurisprudence.2 Chief Justice Marshall
thought the police power generally included governmental duties and powers that
were best exercised locally; such powers were reserved to the states under the
Tenth Amendment,' although other definitions have been proffered.4 Archetypal
examples of the police power include public safety and public health 5 Justice
2

See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (holding that an Iowa
restriction on truck length burdened interstate commerce, despite claim that statute was valid exercise of
police power); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (upholding District of Columbia redevelopment plan as
a valid exercise of the police power); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 322-25 (1890) (ruling that a
Minnesota statute was unconstitutional when it required local inspection of fresh beef no more than twentyfour hours prior to slaughter, effectively excluding all out of state fresh beef); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S.
501, 505-06 (1878) (finding that state police power includes safety regulation of illuminating oils,
notwithstanding grant offederal patent to excluded oil); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 465, 469-70
(1877) (holding that state cannot "under cover of its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either
foreign or interstate commerce") (Strong, J.); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 132-33
(1837) (upholding a rule requiring registration and bonding of all immigrants landing in New York as a local
regulation of paupers under the police power); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,203 (1824) (holding
that grant of exclusive steam powered navigation by New York violated Commerce Clause); see also ERNST
FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTrrTUIONAL RIGHTS (1904); Wendy E. Parmet,

Regulation and Federalism:Legal Impediments to State Health Care Reform, 19 AM. J.L MED. & ETHICS
121 (1993).
3
See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203 (Chief Justice Marshall interpreted a broad role for the Commerce
Clause, but allowed that the states retained certain powers under the Tenth Amendment, including the police
powers, to wit: that "immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory ofa State,
not surrendered to the general government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States
themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating
the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of
this mass."). See also Miln, 36 U.S. at 132; FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, supranote 2, at 3-4. In Gibbonsv.
Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall conceded that state powers reserved under the Tenth Amendment and the

Commerce Clause could both reach the same activity. 22 U.S. at 204-09.
4
Compare, e.g., FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, supra note 2, at iii ("the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property," a formulation so broad that it is
difficult to distinguish the police power from any power permitted under the Constitution), with
CHRISTOPHER GUSTAVUS TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITES

STATES: CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT (1886) (discussing the protection of
individuals in society from direct harm). See also Reynolds & Kopel, supra note 1, at 511 (drawing
comparisons of the view of Freund, Tiedeman and Bork on the police power).
5
See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951) (Madison local pasteurization
ordinance ruled unconstitutional, as it was "not essential for the protection of local health interests" and
burdened interstate commerce, even though Madison's power to protect the health and safety of its people was
"unquestioned"); Mln, 36 U.S. at 133 (New York law requiring registration and bonding of immigrants
landing in New York found to be a proper use of the police power to reduce crime and the state burden for the
care of paupers; no conflict found with federal laws regulating immigration or commerce; police powers
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Douglas, writing for the majority in Berman v. Parker,described it more broadly:
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order - these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the
traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs.
Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not
delimit it .... The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive .... The values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of
the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled.6
2.

Health Regulation in the Early Republic

Historically, health care regulation could be fairly described as local. Prior
to the 1880's, most examples of health regulation in the United States were
responses to the outbreak of infectious disease. Transmission of the relevant
diseases was by face-to-face or local contact, 8 which facilitated a predominantly
local response. These efforts were almost exclusively municipal initiatives, with
little state or federal assistance.9 The first real American hospital was established
described as "powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly be
called internal police." Id. at 139.); Gibbons, 22 U.S. I (health quarantine laws are generally regarded as
police powers).
6
348 U.S. at 32-33 (citations omitted).
7

See generally Helen Brock, North America, A Western Outpost of EuropeanMedicine, in THE
MEDICAL ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (Andrew Cunningham & Roger French, eds.,
1990) (describing the state of the American medical profession after the War of Independence); GEOFFREY
MARKS & WILLIAM K. BEATTY, THE STORY OF MEDICINE IN AMERICA (1973); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL

TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982); Ross D. Silverman, Regulating Medical Practice in the

CyberAge: Issues and Challengesfor State MedicalBoards, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 255,256 nn. 4-7 (2000).
8
Hence the mass exodus from municipalities during epidemics of Yellow Fever, as described in
WILLIAM G. ROTHSTEIN, AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: FROM SECTS TO SCIENCE,

at 58-59 (1972).
9
See MARKS, supra note 7, at 55-64, 263-266 (1973) (discussing the history of municipal response
to epidemics in the Eighteenth Century). The first convention of local health boards was not held until May,
1857. As late as 1872, the effort was still overwhelmingly municipal: only Massachusetts, California and
Virginia had state boards of health, compared to 124 municipal counterparts. See id at 265-66. Federal
work was largely limited to the armed services, such as the Marine Hospital Service for disabled seamen,
established in 1798. Although it appears to be a predecessor to the Veterans Administration, in fact the
Marine Hospital Service eventually became the U.S. Public Health Service at a much later date. See id. at
263; STARR, supra note 7, at 184-85 (discussing the reorganization of the Marine Hospital Service under the
newly appointed Surgeon General in 1870 and the brief tenure of the National Board of Health from 1879 to
1883). One short-lived federal effort was the work of the Freedmen's Bureau, which in 1865 began to
provide relief, education and health care to former slaves and Southerners dislocated by the Civil War. See
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM, A HISTORY OF AFRICAN

AMERICANS 228-32 (7th ed. 1994). For a discussion of the public health history of this period, see James G.
Hodge, Jr., The Role of FederalismandPublic Health Law, 12 J.L & HEALTH 309,325 (1997-98).
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by the City of Philadelphia in 1752.10 The first boards of health were municipal:
Petersburg, Virginia in 1780,11 Baltimore in 1793, Philadelphia in 1794 and Boston
health care themselves until
in 1797.'2 States did
13 not begin to seriously address
War.
Civil
the
after
3.

Jacobsonand Lochner

One example of the health care police power in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries was the power to compel vaccinations. Vaccination litigation
focused on the rights and responsibilities of the individual vis-A-vis the
governmental unit and the obligation to protect the public health against epidemic.
For example, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,14 the Supreme Court upheld a
mandatory vaccination statute, allowing that Massachusetts had the power to enact
"all laws that relate to matters completely within its territory and which do not by
their necessary operation affect the people of other States."15 In this time and place,
the medical model for addressing smallpox was mass vaccination, which
necessitated that a high percentage of the local population be vaccinated.1" Under
the Massachusetts law, local boards of health could evaluate the local health
situation and issue a regulation requiring mandatory smallpox vaccinations of the
local population. Cambridge adopted a local regulation, l" but Jacobson refused to
10

See Brock, supra note 7, at 201; MARKS, supra note 7, at 55-64 (noting that the Philadelphia
Hospital was chartered in 1751 by Dr. Thomas Bond and Benjamin Franklin to care for paupers and to serve
as a teaching hospital).
11
The first board of health appears to have*been founded in Petersburg, Virginia in 1780. See
MARKS, supra note 7, at 263 (1973).
12
See Hodge, supra note 9, at 325-26. Many of these municipal boards oversaw the cleaning of
areas
and the disposal ofwaste. See Brock,supranote 7, at 210.
public
Louisiana was apparently the sole ante-bellum example, in 1855. See Hodge, supra note 9, at 327;
13
STARR, supra note 7, at 184 (noting the ineffectiveness of the Louisiana board). Louisiana was followed by
Massachusetts (1869) (a successful board which was a model in many states), California (1871) and Virginia
(1871). See MARKS, supra note 7, at 266. The magnitude of public health issues raised by the Civil War may
well have spurred the states to act.
14
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
15

Id. at 25 (Harlan, J.). Justice Harlan had the support of only four members of the Court for this
proposition, as shown by the decision two months later in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking
down a New York law regulating the working hours of bakers within the state).
Immunization presents a classic free rider problem. Each immunization carries some incremental
16
cost and risk of iatrogenesis. Effectiveness of immunization as a public health measure requires that a large
percentage of the population be treated. Once this threshold is reached (which varies by disease), then the
population is effectively protected, even though a small minority may not have been immunized. For this
small group (the flee riders), the incremental costs of immunization are likely to outweigh the incremental
benefits to them. Absent a mandatory program, each individual might rationally avoid immunization
altogether, hoping to be one ofthe few who did not undertake the procedure.
The Boston area boasts a celebrated history regarding public health and smallpox. In 1721, the
17
great preacher Cotton Mather and Dr. Zabdiel Boylston defied the authority of the Boston selectmen and
justices as well as the medical establishment and embarked on the first American program of smallpox
inoculation. See Brock, supra note 7, at 208-09; MARKS, supranote 7, at 217-31.
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comply, citing health risks and unproven efficacy. 8 While Jacobson states that
public health is a police power reserved to the states, 19 the reasoning is grounded in
the social compact: the rights of the individual to liberty must be balanced against
the common good of society; Jacobson's right, weighed in the balance, was found
wanting. 20 State power to compel vaccination might be exercised in some localities
and toward particular persons in such an unconstitutionally arbitrary, unreasonable
or unnecessary manner, but such was not the case in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1
The police power of the state will ordinarily be upheld unless the regulation bears
no real or substantial relationship to public health, public morals or public safety, or
is arbitrary or oppressive and invades fundamental rights.22
The Supreme Court historically reviewed the state exercise of health
related police powers under a very deferential standard. Writing in 1904, Professor
Freund stated:
[S]o far no case has arisen in which the judgment of the state that
a restraint was required in the interest of health and safety,
operating exclusively upon internal interests, and respecting the
principle of equality, has been overruled by the United States
Supreme Court.23
One year later, in the much-maligned Lochner case, the Supreme Court
gave Freund the first contrary example, striking down a New York law restricting
the work hours for bakers, enacted on health grounds, as exceeding the police
powers of the state.2 4 The majority searched for an individual right under the
18

Jacobson could point to older cases such as Landon v. Humphrey, 9 Day 209 (Conn. 1832)

(malpractice award of $500 for paralysis of the lower arm following mandatory smallpox vaccination), cited
in KENNETH ALLEN DE VILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA: ORIGINS AND

LEGACY 1 (1990). Evidence questioning the safety of inoculation was abundant in the eighteenth century. A
smallpox epidemic in Boston in 1752 caused 500 deaths, possibly initiated by inoculation. See ROTHSTEIN,
supra note 8, at 30. Inoculation was an early form of vaccination, both less effective and more dangerous.
See MARKS, supra note 7, at 230-31 (discussing the work of Edward Jenner).
19

See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24-25 ("The authority of the State to enact this statute is to be referred
to what is commonly called the police power - a power which the State did not surrender when becoming a
member of the Union under the Constitution.').
20
See id. at 26-28. The Court considered the "local option" nature of the Massachusetts law, which
required vaccination only if the local board determined it was necessary for the public health, as well as the
danger of a smallpox epidemic. Little credence was given to defendant's attempts to disprove the efficacy of
smallpox vaccination or to establish the possibility of iatrogenic harm thereby. See id. at 26-28, 30-31.
21
See id. at 27-28.
22

See id. at 28, 3 1. A narrow majority of the Court recently cited Jacobsonfavorably in Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), a case upholding the involuntary civil commitment of a predatory child
sexual offender. But see Care and Treatment of Crane, 7 P.3d 285 (Kan. 2000) cert. granted 69 U.S.L.W.
3641 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2001) (Kansas Supreme Court distinguished Kansas v. Hendricks, and held that civil
commitment of a sexual offender requires proof that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior).
23

FREUND, supra note 2, at 124.

24

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

For a review of three revisionist books discussing
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Constitution to invalidate the rule, settling upon the "liberty" interest in the
Fourteenth Amendment.25 In the Fourteenth Amendment, the word "liberty" is part
of the Due Process Clause. The Lochner majority opinion is thus a leading
milestone27 on the Court's journey through substantive due process.
4.

Public Health and Interstate Commerce

As the population and interstate travel expanded, health regulation cases
reached the Supreme Court which were not purely local in character. Two
illustrative cases from the early twentieth century are Brimmer v. Rebman28 and
Louisiana v. Texas.29 Both cases address the balance between state public health
regulation and interstate commerce. In Brimmer v. Rebman, a Virginia statute
required inspection of fresh meat sold more than one hundred miles from the place
of slaughter. 3° A tax was imposed to cover the cost of inspection. 1 Prior to railroad
transport and mechanical refrigeration, one hundred miles might have been a
reasonable health restriction? 2 Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the statute as an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce:
Undoubtedly, a state may establish regulations for the protection
of its people against the sale of unwholesome meats, provided
such regulations do not conflict with the powers conferred by the
[C]onstitution upon Congress, or infringe rights granted or
secured by that instrument. But it may not, under the guise of
exerting its police powers, or of enacting inspection laws, make
discriminations against the products and industries of some of the
states in favor of the products and industries of its own or of other

Lochner, see Gary D. Rowe, The Legacy of Lochner: Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 221 (1999) (reviewing OWEN M. FISs, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE,

1888-1910

(1993);

HOWARD GILLMAN, THE

CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993);

and MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL

ORTHODOxY (1992)).
25

See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54.

26

U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.

27

Some would insist it was a millstone. The search for substance in the Fourteenth Amendment may

find stronger textual support in the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See infra note 56 and part VI.
138 U.S. 78 (1891).
28
29
30

176 U.S. 1 (1900).
138 U.S. 78 (1891).

31

See id.

32

See id.
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states.33
In Louisiana v. Texas, reported cases of yellow fever in New Orleans led
Texas to impose a quarantine that Louisiana found objectionable.34 Louisiana
alleged that the Texas quarantine was imposed for discriminatory commercial
reasons having little to do with fear of a yellow fever epidemic. 35 The case was
dismissed on Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional grounds,'s but the Court
evidenced some skepticism concerning the motives of Texas in enacting this
quarantine.
With these cases and others, 37 the Court began to grapple with health
regulation in the interstate context, concomitant with the growth of the nation's
commerce.
B.

The Development ofProfessionalLicensing
1.

The Free Market in Health Care Services: Circa 1850

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the practice of medicine was
carried on in the United States without authoritative professional regulation.' A
national consensus was slow to develop on the need for regulation of the healing
professions. Americans were largely self sufficient in medical matters. 39 Many
turned to autodidactic healers40 who provided succor in a laissez-faire
33
34

Brimmer, 138 U.S. at 82.
176 U.S. 1 (1900).
See id.

See id. at 22-23. Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence was recently discussed in Bd. of Trustees of
the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J.) and Kimel v. FloridaBd of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000) (O'Connor, J.). Oral arguments will be heard in Fall 2001 in another Eleventh
Amendment case, Mathias v. WorldCom Tech., Inc., cert granted 1215 S.Ct. 1224 (2001). The resurgence of
the Eleventh Amendment can be viewed as another echelon of new federalism.
37

See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (Madison pasteurization law
operated
as a violation of the Commerce Clause by effectively prohibiting the sale of milk from Illinois); Compagnie
Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (anti-immigration restriction upheld as a
valid quarantine restriction); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898) (Pennsylvania ban on
oleomargarine was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce).
3

Virtually every state passed nonexclusive licensing laws by the end of the eighteenth century.
See
Brock, supra note 7, at 204 (English experience with professional monopolies created broad colonial
opposition to exclusive professional licensure); see also DE VILLE, supra note 18, at 65-86. Beginning in
1838, states repealed even the weak nonexclusive laws. By 1850, only New Jersey and the District of
Columbia had any authoritative regulation of physicians. See id. at 86. This may have been the height of
laissez-faire in health care in America.
39

See Brock, supra note 7, at 215 (discussing the domestic and folk medicine practiced in America).

40

Freedom from exclusive licensing permitted many alternative forms of therapy to flourish, some
of which were quite dangerous. See DE VILLE, supra note 18, at 79-81. Rival medical sects hindered the
move to exclusive licensure, jealous for their position and income. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 8, at 305.
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environment. 4 Given what we know about the poor quality of elite American
42
medicine in the 1800's, this was not an entirely irrational response. This free
market environment also suited the political philosophy of the Revolution and the
Jacksonian era: In lieu of the English experience with. Crown monopolies in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Americans were determined to oppose
exclusive privileges such as mandatory licensure of professionals.43
The result was an absence of authoritative state regulation. The enacted
rules were mostly limited to nonexclusive licenses that did not grant a monopoly
over the practice of medicine:
The limited nature of medical knowledge and the lack of skill of
American physicians were reflected in colonial medical licensure
laws. Throughout the colonial period, physicians attempted to
obtain licensure legislation limiting the practice of medicine to
qualified practitioners. Most legislatures, however, would enact
only honorific licensing measures ....
Typically, the nonexclusive license boards operated on a county level,
evaluating the applicant's education and other qualifications, and receiving a fee if
the application was approved.45 This pecuniary interest did not motivate a careful
screening process.4 Worse, a license was valid statewide and an applicant could
turn to various county boards, seriatim, until one found the applicant (or the fee)
acceptable.47 The resulting low standards were predictable,8 but not necessarily
Some ofthese traditional healers were Native Americans. See Brock, supra note 7, at 213-16. For a proposal
regarding current use of Native American healers under the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, see Holly
T. Kuschell-Haworth, Jumping Through Hoops: Traditional Healers and the Indian Health Care
Improvement Act, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 843 (1999).
It is reasonable to describe the health care market as "market driven" during this period, a phrase
41
which has recently gained currency in health policy and management circles. See, e.g. REGINA

HERZLINGER,
MARKET DRrVEN HEALTH CARE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF AmERiCA'S

LARGEST SERVICE INDuSTRY (1997) (without a discussion of the previous existence of a flee market in health
care services in America).
See STARR, supra note 7, at 56. The poor state of elite medicine was more of a scientific failure
42
than a market failure. See id
43
See The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 104 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting); Brock,
supra note 7, at 204; STARR, supra note 7, at 56-59. The history of the licensure and regulation ofthe health
professions in the United Kingdom is quite different during this period. See generally THE MEDICAL
ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (Andrew Cunningham & Roger French, eds., 1990)
(collected essays on 18th century British and colonial medical practice); NOEL PARRY & JOSE PARRY, THE
RISE OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION (1976) (history of British apothecaries and physicians).
44

ROTHSTEIN, supra note 8, at 37.

4

See i.

46

See Id.

47

See id.

48

See id. at 79.
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detrimental to the public good. Low threshold standards permit competition and
allow consumers to choose lower quality services or services well suited to their
particular needs or interests.49
2.

The Shift Towards Professional Regulation: 1850 - 1920

The environment began to change in the decades following the 1850's. The
American Medical Association was formed, and devised its Code of Ethics at its
second convention in 184 7.5o
Advances in scientific medicine finally provided
treatments that were effective and a basis for dispassionate evaluation of the
various medical sects and treatment alternatives."' The authority of elite physicians
soared during this period, particularly during the Spanish American War,5 2 giving
physicians greater power to set regulatory standards.5 With enforceable standards
came a dramatic increase in medical malpractice cases tried against physicians.~S
The rival sects of medicine began to form joint medical boards in an effort to
present a united front to the state in their appeal for tougher licensing laws.as Each
state addressed these questions individually, only gradually converging towards
compatible regulatory positions through fortuity, reciprocity agreements or model
laws. The state power to regulate professions was given great latitude in The
Slaughter House Cases,56 and found similar freedom in Dent v. West Virginia to
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 196-97 (1993) (citing Keith B. Leffler,
PhysicianLicensure: Competition andMonopoly in American Medicine, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 165 (1978)).
49

.5o

See DEVILLE, supra note 18, at 79.

See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 8,at 323-24; HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS,
DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND HEALTH INSURANCE: THE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING OF MEDICAL CARE 22
(1961) (describing the impact of germ theory and antibiotics on medicine in the 1860s and 1870s).
52
See STARR, supra note 7, at 141 (describing the positive change in attitudes of military line
51

officers towards physicians, particularly with regard to infectious diseases).
53

1930)).
54
55

See id. at 79-144 (Book One, Chapter Three: The Consolidation of Professional Authority 1850See DEVILLE, supra note 18, at 65.
See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 8, at 305-10.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (In a 5-4 decision, the Court allowed a Louisiana law to stand which
granted an exclusive slaughter house franchise for New Orleans to a single corporation, arguably
dispossessing hundreds of butchers and others of their professions; in reaching this result, the Court offered a
narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause). If the Privileges or
Immunities Clause had applied in this situation, the Court could have found a substantive right in the
Fourteenth Amendment independent of the Due Process Clause.
This particular issue is generating
considerable scholarly attention. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life
After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071 (2000);
Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privilegesor Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House
Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the FourteenthAmendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1
(1996); Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: 'Its Hour Come Round at Last'?, 1972
WASH. U. L.Q. 405 (1972); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privilegesor Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
L.J. 1385 (1992); Tim A. Lemper, Recent Case: The Promise and Perils of "Privileges or Immunities":
Saenz v.Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 295 (1999); Daniel J.Levin, Note,
Reading the Privileges or Immunities Clause: Textual Irony, Analytical Revisionism, and an Interpretive
56
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regulate the health professions under the police power.7
This power knew few limits. In Hawker v. New York, the plaintiff in error
had practiced medicine in New York for many years prior to the adoption of the
physician licensing law in 18 9 3 .58 The state established standards for physician
licensure, including educational and competency requirements. 59 One of these
standards barred a convicted felon from the practice of medicine. 6 Hawker had
been convicted of a felony in New York some twenty years prior to the adoption of
the physician licensing law.6' Writing for the majority, Justice Brewer sided with
the police power of the state to protect "the ignorant and credulous" from "the
imposition of quacks, adventurers, and charlatans," despite the argument that an ex
post facto punishment was levied thereby.62 Upon reading Justice Harlan's dissent,
we learn that the prior felony was for performing an abortion.63 Beyond the specific
facts of the case, Hawker and its siblings hold that the state police
power to
64
regulate the professions is limited only by the rational connection test.
Truce, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 569 (2000); Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism
Straight: A Reinterpretationof the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE LJ. 643 (2000); Trisha Olson, The
Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the FourteenthAmendment, 48 ARK. L.
REV. 347 (1995); Derek Shaffer, Note, Answering Justice Thomas in Saenz: Granting the Privileges or
Immunities Clause Full Citizenship Within the Fourteenth Amendment, 54 STAN. L. REv. 709 (2000);
Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privilegesor Immunities Clause to Redress the Balance
Among States,Individuals,and the FederalGovernment, 3 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 1 (1998); Laurence H. Tribe,
Comment, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privilegesor Immunities Revival Portendthe Future - or Reveal

the Structure ofthe Present?; 113 HARv. L. REV. '110 (1999); Stacey L Winick, Comment, A New Chapter
In ConstitutionalLaw: Saenz v. Roe andthe Revival of the FourteenthAmendment's Privileges orImmunities
Clause,28 HoFsTRA L. REV. 573 (1999).
57
129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889) (in a case involving a physician who was already practicing in West
Virginia when the state passed its physician licensing law, the Court held that while persons have a right to
pursue any lawful calling or business, the state, under its police power, can impose regulation for the general
welfare, even if the effect is to prevent a person from practicing the profession); see also Semler v. Oregon
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (state board may regulate the practice of dentistry in its
discretion); McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344 (1917) (ophthalmologist did not prevail on a Fourteenth
Amendment claim; state regulation upheld); Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912) (osteopath found to
violate state medical practice statute; no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Watson v. Maryland, 218
U.S. 173, 175-76 (1910) (state statute prohibiting the practice of medicine without state registration does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 194 (1898) (state had broad
discretion in describing the qualifications necessary to practice medicine in the state); see also Silverman,
supranote 7, at 257.
58
170 U.S. 189 (1898).
5

See id.

60
61

See id
See id.

6

Id. at 194-95 (quotingState v. Hathaway, 21 S.W. 1081, 1083 (Mo. 1893)).

63
See id. at 201 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that at the time of Hawker's crime, the abortion
statute did not impose the additional penalty of prohibition from the practice of medicine; to reach the same
result through the subsequently enacted physician licensing statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law)
64
See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (upholding
conditions to granting a license to practice law so long as the condition bears a rational connection with the
applicants "fitness or capacity to practice law").
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The revolution from laissez-faire to monopoly regulation was substantially
completed before 1920.6 Indeed, by 1910, the Court thought that the ability of a
state to utilize its police power to regulate trades and professions was "too well
settled" to warrant detailed discussion, particularly when the issue related closely to
public health,66 limited only by constitutional provisions such as the Fourteenth
Amendment,6 7 the First Amendment,68 the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause6 9 and the Commerce Clause. 70 As Professor Epstein has bemoaned,
government has been unable to resist the temptation to attach economic conditions
to licensure.71

65

See Richards, supranote I, at 210 (1999); see also supra note 7 and sources cited therein.

66

Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. at 176.
U.S CONST. amend. XIV; see Polhemus v. AMA, 145 F.2d 357 (1944).

67

Several early cases

challenging state regulation were brought (unsuccessfully) under the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supranote 57 and sources cited therein.
68
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Health Systems Agency of Northern Virginia v. Virginia State Bd. of
Medicine, 424 F. Supp. 267 (1976).
U.S CONST. art. IV, § 2. Modem cases interpreting the Article IV Privileges and Immunities

69

Clause generally involve discriminatory treatment of non-residents, such as Lunding v. New York Tax
Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998) (denial of alimony expense deductions for non-residents was a
"unwarranted denial to citizens of other States of the privileges and immunities enjoyed by citizens of New
York"), and United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Mayor and Councilof Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (a
basic right is at stake when nonresidents are denied employment in public works due to a 4 0% residency
hiring requirement). The state professional licensure of attorneys has also been limited under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988) (Privileges
and Immunities Clause forbids Virginia Supreme Court rule that required non-resident attorneys to obtain
permanent residence in Virginia in order to gain Virginia bar admission by reciprocity without examination);
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (bar admission cannot be limited to state
residents; under Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis, the practice of law is protected as a national
fundamental right).
70
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. After Darbyv. United States, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the state police
power is susceptible to complete preemption by federal legislation under the Commerce Clause and the
Spending Power, although the holding of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) raised
some questions concerning the Tenth Amendment. In National League of Cities, five members of the Court
decided that the Commerce Clause did not "directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," a holding which was overruled nine years later
when Justice Blackmun switched sides in Garciav. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
A proper discussion of these cases must be saved for another day, as well as discussion of new federalism
cases such as New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Congress cannot "commandeer" state
governments to regulate, grounded in the federal structure of the Constitution as well as the Tenth
Amendment) and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (lack of a substantial, commercial
jurisdictional nexus between interstate commerce and the Gun-Free School Zones Act caused the Act to fall
outside of the Commerce Clause).
71
See EPSTEIN, supra note 49, at 198-202; see also Michael H. LeRoy, et al., The Law and
Economics of Collective Bargaining for Hospitals: An Empirical Public Policy Analysis of Bargaining Unit
Determinations, 9 YALE J. REG. 1 (1992) (discussing whether courts have been too willing to enforce
restrictions on licensure).
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HEALTHCARE, TECHNOLOGY & FEDERALISM
Swnmary: Health Care Regulation from the Era of Gas Lamps to
Genomics

The regulation of health care was, of practical necessity, a municipal
function during the Colonial period, remaining so during the first century of the
Republic. State regulation prior to the 1850's was sporadic, ineffective and often
merely carried water for local efforts. The federal role prior to the New Deal was
primarily confined to the armed forces, Native Americans, and the short-lived
Freedmen's Bureau.72 Only gradually did the state and federal roles expand, as
technology and mobility progressed73 Driven by the technological and social level
of the ambient society, municipal regulation of health care was a reflection of the
era, rather than an immutable Constitutional principle of federalism, much as the
municipal nature of gas lamps in the 1800's does not necessarily control modem
jurisprudence concerning utilities. 74 As health care has developed from the era of
gas lamps to modem genomics, so has the regulatory milieu. These developments
are chronicled in the following sections.
III. THE GROWTH OF FEDERAL HEALTH CARE REGULATION UNDER THE
SPENDING POWER AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

4.

The Growth of FederalHealth CareExpenditures

Following the New Deal and the Great Society, the federal role in health
care expanded with vigor. In the -New Deal, Congress exercised the CommerceClause authority to regulate, while the Great Society funded that authority with
social programs. Beginning in 1948, the federal government financed the
construction of thousands of hospital projects under the Hill-Burton program.7'
Medicare and Medicaid were adopted in 1965, and today, the federal government
In his well-regarded study of American medicine in he eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Paul
Star has little to say about federal health care activity prior to 1930. See STARR, supra note 7, at 30-32; see
also Hodge, supra note 9, at 330 n.129 (describing the increased federal role after the New Deal); KuschellHaworth, supra note 40, at 845-46 (discussing the Snyder Act of 1921); FRANKLIN, supra note 9, at 228-32
(Freedmen's Bureau).
72

,See Michael S. Morgenstem, The Role of the Federal Government in ProtectingCitizens from
Communicable Diseases,47 U. CIN. L.R. 537,541-44 (1978).
74
See, e.g. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (FCC had authority under
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to implement local-competition rules for telephone services); but see id at
402 ("Since Alexander Graham Bell invited the telephone in 1876, the States have been, for all practical
purposes, exclusively responsible for regulating intrastate telephone service. Although the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 altered that more than century-old tradition, the majority takes the Act too
far in transferring the States' regulatory authority wholesale to the Federal Communications Commission.")
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
75
See Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946,42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o-1 (2000). By June 30,
1971, 10,748 Hill-Burton hospital construction projects had been approved, at a total cost of $12.8 billion,
73

including the federal share totalling $3.7 billion. See JUDITH R. LAvE & LESTER B. LAv, THE HosPITAL
CONSTRUCTION ACT: AN EVALUATION OF THE HILL-BURTON PROGRAM, 1948-1973 13 (1974).
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spends $267.8 billion per yeair7 to finance the health care of approximately 39
million Americans77 through Medicare. 8 Medicaid7 ' reaches 36 million indigent
residents'8 at an annual combined state and federal cost of $203.3 billion.8 ' An
additional 3.3 million low-income children82 are covered by SCHIP.83
This growth in the federal role in health care can be attributed to at least
three causes. First, social change encouraged a federal role, as a result of "varying
patterns of economic growth, shifts in population to urban areas, societal changes,
and, of course, the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment." 4 Second, the
federal role was a recognition that medical technology and understanding had
progressed: it was no longer deemed sufficient to treat infectious diseases at a local
level since coordinated national and international efforts could be more effectivea 5
Finally, health was increasingly recognized as a public good, and the cost of an
effective response necessitated access to national sources of revenue to fund the
programs.88
B.

Gibbons v. Ogden

The seeds of this federal sequoia may be found in Gibbons v. Ogden, a
familiar case wherein Chief Justice Marshall established a broad role for federal
power under the Commerce Clause.87 In Gibbons, all state powers that affect
commerce with foreign nations or among the states are subject to concurrent federal
jurisdiction, including preemption under the Supremacy Clause. Chief Justice
76

See Sheila Smith et al., The Next Ten Years of Health Spending: What Does the FutureHold?.,

HEALTH AFFAIRS Sep./Oct. 1998, at 129 (projected 2001 costs).
77

See Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare Basics (2001) (visited Apr. 26, 2001)
<http.//www.medicare.gov/basics/overview.asp>.
78

See Social Security Amendments of 1965 (Medicare), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ggg (2000).

79

See Social Security Amendments of 1965 (Medicaid), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000).

so

See Health Care Financing Administration, Medicaid Information (2001) (visited Apr. 26, 2001)
<http'/www.hcfagov/medicaidmedicaid.htm>.
81
See Smith, supranote 76, at 129.
2

See Health Care Financing Adminisration, State Children'sHealth Insurance Program (2001)

(visited Apr. 26,2001) <httpJ/www.hcfagov/initfy2000.pdf>.
83

See Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (SCHIP), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397jj (2001).

84

Hodge, supra note 9, at n. 128 and accompanying text.

The global eradication of smallpox would not have been possible without international
See FRANK FENNER, ED., SMALLPOX AND ITS ERADICATION (History of International Public
Health, No. 6) (1989).
85

cooperation.

86

See SOMERS, supra note 51, at 397 et seq. (in a Brookings Institute study published four years

before the adoption of Medicare, the authors discuss the need for comprehensive health coverage); see also
Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND. L.R. 1485, 1497-98 (1994) (the New Deal required

federal intervention because the crisis was beyond the resources of the states).
87

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
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Marshall refused to restrict the Commerce Clause to a geographical interpretation,'s
reasoning that commerce among the states may begin and end at any point within a
state and does not acquire and relinquish its constitutional character merely for the
brief moment of passage across a state boundary. 9 The Commerce Clause thus
grants "plenary" power to the federal government,' ° leaving to exclusive state
jurisdiction only "completely internal" matters. 9' Even this limited sphere may not
be constitutionally mandated, but' is left to the states when federal regulation is
"inconvenient" and "unnecessary." 2
The scope of the Commerce Clause has suffered many refinements since
1824,9 but the modem view is remarkably consistent with Chief Justice Marshall's
vision."
C.

The Growth ofFederalHealth Care Regulation

Federal regulation of health care is grounded in two Article 1, Section 8
enumerated powers: the Spending Power and the Commerce Clause.
1.

The Spending Power

Under the Spending Power, Congress attaches conditions upon the receipt
of federal funds, such as state adoption of regulations or accession to federal

es

See id.at 203.

as

See id at 195.

90

Id at 196.

91

Id. at 194.

92

Gibbons,22 U.S. at 194.

Only thirteen years later, but after the death of Chief Justice Marshall, the Court in Mayor ofNew
York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 1OZ 139 (1837), stated that under the Constitution, police powers were "not
thus surrendered or restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority ofa State is complete,
unqualified and exclusive." Id at 139. One reading of Mayor of New York v. Miln is that it stands for local
law enforcement and the regulation of paupers as police powers under exclusive and unqualified state control.
See Ia at 139 and 148 ("Can anything fall more directly within the police power and internal regulation ofa
State, than that which concerns the care and management of paupers or convicts ... ?") (Thompson, J.,
concurring). While language in the case is arguably to blame for this conclusion, it seems clear that if the
regulation at issue had clearly conflicted with a valid federal commerce statute, then the Supremacy Clause
would have intervened. See id. at 158 (Story, J., dissenting). In addition, if the apparent holding of Mayorof
New York v. Miln is to be believed, then what are we to make of the federalization of crimes committed
within the states, or of the current federal programs to alleviate poverty, if the authority of the state in these
areas is "complete, unqualified and exclusive"? Id at 139. For a discussion of the federal police power, or
the lack thereof,see supra note I and sources cited therein.
93

See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ("At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall
described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded."); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 when applied to a lumber manufacturer, held to
be a proper use of the Commerce Clause); but see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
94
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standards.95 As the Greek army was admitted into Troy within the famous horse, so
federal regulation has followed the appropriation of federal health care funds.'
Some examples will illustrate the scope of this power.
a.

The Hill-Burton Act

The regulatory price of federal Hill-Burton97 funds included standards
relating to construction,' the prevailing wage rule of the Davis-Bacon Act,'
responsibility to provide charity care,"ro and possible exposure to civil rights
actions for discrimination. 10 1
b.

The

National

Health

Planning and Resources

95

Cooperative federalism ties receipt of federal money to voluntary accession by the recipient states
to federal regulatory requirements. Prominent examples include Medicaid, Aid to Families With Dependent
Children, and the Federal Highway Program. See Jerry L.Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Casefor
Federalism and Health Care Reform, 28 CONN L.R. 115 (1995). In many cases, the federal programs in
question are so important to the states that the likelihood of rejection of the federal offer is slight. This
relationship might be better termed "co-opted federalism". Id. While many of us may be forgiven for deeming
the Spending Power as plenary and well settled, a recent symposium revealed potential challenges to the
Spending Power, together with its traditional defenses. Compare Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and
the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAPMAN L. REV. 195 (2001) (calling for greater judicial scrutiny under the
Spending Clause); John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General"to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAPMAN L
REV. 63 (2001) (historical analysis of the meaning of "general" as a limitation on the Spending Clause);
Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting Through the Dole Loopholes, 4
CHAPMAN. L. REv. 163 (2001) (vindicate federalism interests through enhanced scrutiny of conditions placed
on receipt of federal funds); and Bradley A. Smith, Hamilton at Wits End: The Lost Discipline of the
Spending Clause vs. the False Discipline of Campaign Finance Reform, 4 CHAPMAN L. REv. 117 (2001) (a
broad interpretation of the Spending Clause places unrealistic pressure on the campaign finance system); with
Erwin Chemerinsky, Protectingthe Spending Power, 4 CHAPMAN L. REv. 89 (2001) (traditional defense of
Spending Power); Earl M. Maltz, Sovereignty, Autonomy and ConditionalSpending, 4 CHAPMAN L. REV.
107 (2001) (state autonomy is best left to the political process).
9

Beware of bureaucracies bearing gifts. Unlike Troy, the federal strings should not have come as a
surprise, but see McCall v. Pacificare of California, Inc.,
_ Cal. 4th _ (opinion filed May 3, 2001),
available at 2001 WL 460692 (Cal.) ("Ironically, '[t]he first section of the Medicare Act explicitly states
[Congress's] intent to minimize federal intrusion in the area.'") (quoting Massachusetts Medical Society v.
Dukasis, 815 F.2d 790, 791 (1st Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)).
97
See supranote 75.
98

See 42 U.S.C. § 291c(b) (2000).

99

See 42 U.S.C. § 291e(a)(5) (2000). The Davis-Bacon Act is codified at 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a-276a-5

(2000).
100

See Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d I115 (10th Cir, 1972) (receipt of Hill-Burton funds creates clear
duty to provide reasonable amounts of charity care); see also Gordon v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 409 F.
Supp. 708, affd in part andvacated in part on other grounds 544 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1976) (hospital that did
not receive Hill-Burton funds is not obligated to provide charity care); but cf Lile v. Univ. of Iowa Hosp. &
Clinics, 674 F. Supp. 288 (1987) (no duty to provide charity care when Hill-Burton repayment obligation was
met through alternative means).
101
Compare Hodge v. Paoli Mem'l Hosp. 576 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1978) (mere acceptance of HillBurton funds does not bring all hospital actions under color of state law); with Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (receipt of Hill-Burton funds is sufficient state action to implicate
the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol103/iss4/6

16

Outterson: Health Care, Technology and Federalism

2001]

HEALTHCARE, TECHNOLOGY & FEDERALISM

Development Act
Beginning in 1974, acceptance of federal funds also obligated states to
adopt certificate of need laws relating to health facility planning. 2 Most states
have retained these laws, 10 3 even after the federal requirement was abolished in
1986.'0 4 Like the fossilized footprints of an extinct dinosaur, the tracks of the
federal National Health Planning law can still be found in the laws of 35 states.
c.

MedicareandMedicaidConditions ofParticipation

Acceptance of Medicare and Medicaid funding requires that health care
providers such as hospitals meet HCFA's Conditions of Participation covering
many aspects of facility operation and regulation."0 Since Medicare, Medicaid, and
related government programs account for estimated annual revenues of $637.4
billion in 2001,06 this is an offer that cannot be refused. These rules are often
enforced through private accreditation organizations. For hospitals, the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations is the private
accreditation organization that meets Medicare's standards."0 7 The uniform national
standards of the Joint Commission represent a federalization of hospital licensing
108
standards, enforced upon state licensed hospitals through the vector of Medicare.
d.

Prohibition of Private Practice with Medicare-Eligible
Individuals

Medicare prohibits a physician from providing private medical services to
Medicare-eligible individuals unless the physician certifies to Medicare that the

102

See National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300k-I et

seq. (1986) repealedby Pub. L. 99-660, § 701(a) (Nov. 14, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987).

According to a November 1999 survey, 35 states retain CON laws. Community Catalyst,
Certificate of Need Laws: A Comparison of State Laws Chart (1999) (visited Apr. 26, 2001)
<http://www.communityeat.org/index.php3?fldlD=89>. For a complete survey of the history of the adoption
and repeal of the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act, see Patrick John McGinley,
Beyond Health Reform: ReconsideringCertificateof Need Laws In A ManagedCompetitionSystem, 23 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 141 (1995).
103

104

See McGinley, supra note 103.

105

Conditions of participation have been established for hospitals, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (2001); 42

C.F.R. §§ 482.1-482.66 (2001) and home health services, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m); 42 C.F.R. §§ 484.1-484.55
(2001), as well as several other types of providers.
108

See Smith, supra note 76, at 129.

107

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a) (2001).

108

The Joint Commission has embarked on a cooperative federalism project since it began

recognizing the work of other accreditation organizations in some circumstances. See Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Government Relations, Cooperative Accreditation Initiative
(2001) (visited May 2, 2001) <http'//www.jcaho.org/govt/reduction.html>.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2001

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 103, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 6

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 103:503

physician will not participate in Medicare for at least two full years."° This
extraordinary interference with freedom of contract cannot be waived by the
patient. 110 Given the significant role that Medicare reimbursement plays in most
physician's practices, few are likely to agree to a two year program termination.
This provision might be testing the outer boundaries of the Spending Power.11'
2.

The Commerce Clause

The federal government has also adopted substantive health regulation
under the Commerce Clause, unrelated to the receipt of federal funds, which in
some cases explicitly pre-empts state law. 112 Some of these laws have interesting
technological components. In this vein, consider the HIPAA administrative
simplification rules," 3 which require national 1 4 adoption of certain data formats for
all health care transactional information. Prior to adoption, approximately 400
different formats for health care data transfer11 s crippled efforts to adopt a more
efficient consensual standard. HIPAA was enacted, in part, to bring order to the
health information chaos, saving tens of billions of dollars." 6
A second major HIPAA provision imposed federal standards on health
insurance portability and other market reforms. In the market reform rules,
Congress gave each state three choices: (1) pass state health insurance laws in
compliance with the federal standard and retain local enforcement; (2) create an
acceptable alternative approved by HCFA and enforce it1 with local agencies; or (3)
default to the federal rules with enforcement by HCFA. 7
109

See 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.400-405.455 (1999).

110

See id.

ill

In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court upheld a ten percent set-aside program

under the Spending Power, but the scope of the Spending Power cannot be unlimited, South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra note 95.
112
The HIPAA administrative simplification provision pre-empts contrary state law, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-7(a)(1) (2000), whereas the HIPAA privacy law leaves more restrictive state law in place, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-7(a)(2)(B) (2000).
113
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to 1320d-8
(2001). Two sets of final regulations have been issued to date under this law: the Transactions and Code Set
Rules, 42 C.F.R. §§ 160.101-162.1802 (2001) and the Privacy Rule, 42 C.F.R. §§ 160.101-160.312 (2001).
114
The successful adoption of national standards leads to the question of whether international

standards are also appropriate. Some current standards enjoy international adoption, such as time and
calendar; others remain rooted in national or regional practice such as consumer electrical distribution.
115
See Health Insurance Reform: Standards for Electronic Transactions, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,312 (Aug.
17,2000) (preamble).

116

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that the administrative

simplification regulations will provide a net savings to the health care industry of $29.9 billion over 10 years.
See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, HHS News, HHS Announces Electronic StandardsTo Simpli5y
Health Care Transactions (Aug. 11, 2000), (visited Apr. 26, 2001) <http:llaspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/
final/press 1.htm>.
117

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg to 300gg-92 (2001); Len M. Nichols and Linda J. Blumberg, A Different
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A final example, completely unrelated to HIPAA, is Title 21 of the United
States Code, Food and Drug, by which the federal government preempted much of
the regulation of food and drug safety, which had previously been handled by the
states. State regulation of food had given rise to several Supreme Court cases, often
concerning unfair burdens on interstate commerce cast by state health and safety
laws. 118
IV. TECHNOLOGY AND CHANGE
Technology has altered the balance in both healthcare and federalism. As
we have seen, the emergence of scientific medicine gave birth to the modem
medical profession, as well as authoritative state regulation.119 Technology supports
the bureaucratic apparatus through which the federal government collects taxes to
fund the exercise of the Spending Power. The Industrial Revolution and
urbanization placed people and machines in dangerous juxtaposition, eventually
leading to public health and safety regulation.12 The introduction of the steamship,
the railroad, the automobile, and air transport each provided additional mobility.
Mobility of both people121 and commerce arguably spelled the doom of judicially
enforced states' rights under the Commerce Clause, as Professor Kramer recounts:
To begin with, between the Civil War and World War I the
economies of the separate states became functionally integrated.
By 1930, practically everyone consumed or produced goods
bought and sold in other states. Improvements in transportation
and communication accelerated this process, as wire services and
radio (not to mention telegraph and telephone) made events
around the country immediately accessible. Other states became
less distant, and what happened there was of considerable
importance. These developments, in turn, made national solutions
necessary for problems that had previously been handled at the
state level. As product, labor, and capital markets became
nationally integrated, state regulation ceased to work; in many
instances it became part of the problem. Distinctions like
Kind of 'New Federalism? The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, May/Jun. 1998, at 34. Most states chose the first path. See id.
118
See, e.g., supranotes 2, 5 and 37 and sources cited therein.
119

See supra parts f and III.

120

See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 66 (1905) ("While this [police] power is inherent in

all governments, it has doubtless been greatly expanded in its application during the past century, owing to an
enormous increase in the number of occupations which are dangerous, or so far detrimental, to the health of
employees as to demand special precautions for their well-being and protection, or the safely of adjacent
property.") (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
121
Americans continue to be mobile individuals. See Robert Suro, Movement at Warp Speed, AM.
DEMoGRAPHIcs, Aug. 1,2000.
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"commerce versus manufacture," "direct versus indirect," or
"local versus interstate" no longer made sense in a nation where
effects necessarily rippled across state lines.
Matters came to a head with the economic crisis of the
1930s, which proved beyond the competence of states to deal with
individually. FDR's New Deal called for federal regulation on an
unprecedented scale. After a brief but spirited effort to hold the
line, the Supreme Court capitulated in a series of well known
decisions rendered between 1937 and 1942. The federal
government acquired vastly expanded power to regulate private
activity, and for all practical purposes the era of judicially
enforced federalism came to an end."z
Justice O'Connor, while recognizing the historical record, "would prefer to
hold the field and, at the very least, render a little aid to the wounded:'23
Due to the emergence of an integrated and industrialized national
economy, this Court has been required to examine and review a
breathtaking expansion of the powers of Congress. In doing so the
Court correctly perceived that the Framers of our Constitution
intended Congress to have sufficient power to address national
problems. But the Framers were not single-minded. The
Constitution is animated by an array of intentions. Just as surely as
the Framers envisioned a National Government capable of solving
national problems, they also envisioned a republic whose vitality
was assured by the diffusion of power not only among the
branches of the Federal Government, but also between the Federal
Government and the States. In the 18th century these intentions
did not conflict because technology had not yet converted every
local problem into a national one. A conflict has now emerged,
and the Court today retreats rather than reconcile the
Constitution's dual concerns for federalism and an effective
commerce power. 24
Technological change is not always a sufficient warrant for legal change.
In the assisted suicide case, the Court noted that "[b]ecause of advances in
medicine and technology, Americans today are increasingly likely to die in

Kramer, supra note 86, at 1497-98 (footnotes omitted). Economists might say that increased
mobility highlighted locational disparities and interstate externalities, both of which argued for a federal
standard. See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic andPoliticalLook at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. LR. 895
122

(1992).
123

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985).

124

Id. at 581 (citations omitted in text and footnotes).
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institutions, from chronic illness. ' 125 Despite the nod to technological change, the
Court stepped back from embracing a constitutional right to die:
C

Attitudes toward suicide itself have changed since Bracton, but
our laws have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit,
assisting suicide. Despite changes in medical technology and
notwithstanding an increased emphasis on the importance of end
of life decision-making, we have not retreated from this
prohibition. 26
In addition, technology itself has changed. The icon of the Industrialized
Revolution was the factory: a centralized, automated process center. In the Digital
Revolution, the Internet has replaced the factory as the favored model, with the
potential for a decentralizing technological paradigm. Digital technology "may
make local regulation desirable at one time, national at another, local at still a third
(as may be happening now in the swiftly developing communications industry).""12
Two notable features of digital technology are its ability to reduce information
costs and compress distance: "In general, in terms of information, much of what
was scarce is becoming abundant, much of what was distant is coming closer, much
of what was secret is opening up. ,128
A4.

Technology andInformation Costs

In his remarkably prescient essay at the end of the Second World War, Dr.
Vannevar Bush sketched the blueprint for the Internet, which he called the
"memex," as a tool for greatly reducing the cost of information storage and
retrieval, and thus advancing civilization:
Presumably man's spirit should be elevated if he can better review
his shady past and analyze more completely and objectively his
present problems. He has built a civilization so complex that he
needs to mechanize his records more fully if he is to push his
experiment to its logical conclusion and not merely become
bogged down part way there -by overtaxing his limited memory.
His excursions may be more enjoyable if he can reacquire the
privilege of forgetting the manifold things he does not need to
have immediately at hand, with some assurance that he can find

125

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,716 (1997) (citation omitted).

126

Id at 719.

Kramer, supra note 86, at 1500 (concurrent state and federal jurisdiction allows power to be
allocated and reallocated, but courts are poorly suited to make these judgments; hence, he concludes,
judicially enforced federalism is dead).
128
M. Ethan Katsh, Symposium: Emerging Media Technology and the First Amendment: Rights,
Camera,Action: CyberspatialSettingsand the FirstAmendment, 104 YALE LJ. 1681,1687 (1995).

.127
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them again if they prove important.
The applications of science have built man a wellsupplied house, and are teaching him to live healthily therein.
They have enabled him to throw masses of people against one
another with cruel weapons. They may yet allow him truly to
encompass the great record and to grow in the wisdom of race
experience. He may perish in conflict before he learns to wield
that record for his true good. Yet, in the application of science to
the needs and desires of man, it would seem to be a singularly
unfortunate state at129which to terminate the process, or to lose hope
as to the outcome.
Knowledge that is no longer centrally controlled, but is readily available in
distributed form such as the Internet can theoretically support distributed forms of
government as well:
The hope for self-government today lies not in relocating
sovereignty but in dispersing it. The most promising alternative to
the sovereign state is not a cosmopolitan community based on the
solidarity of humankind but a multiplicity of communities and
political bodies - some more extensive than nations and some less
- among which sovereignty is diffused.1' 3
Of course, George Orwell was possessed of a decidedly more pessimistic
view of the authoritarian possibilities inherent in the modem age.
B.

Technology andDistanceCompression

Distance compression is not unique to digital technology. The introduction
of the automobile expanded the geographic scope of the physician's practice,
increasing market penetration in the early twentieth century.' 3' All forms of modem
communication and transportation can be seen as distance (or time) compression
devices. The unique feature of the Internet is its complete indifference to geography
and distance: 32 "these lines on the ground mean little in cyberspace."'13
129

Vannever Bush, As We May Think, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jul. 1945, at 108.

Michael J. Sandel, America's Search for a New Public Philosophy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1996, at 57, 73-74, quoted in David R- Johnson & David Post, Symposium: Surveying Law andBorders: Law
andBorders - The Rise ofLaw in Cyberspace,48 STAN. L.R. 1367, 1397 (1996).
130

131

See STARR, supra note 7, at 65.

132

See Dan L. Burk, Jurisdictionin a World Without Borders, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3 (1997); Johnson,

supra note 130, at 1368, 1370 ("Territorial borders, generally speaking, delineate areas within which different
sets of legal rules apply. There has until now been a general correspondence between borders drawn in
physical space (between nation states or other political entities) and borders in 'law space'.... The Net thus
radically subverts the system of rule-making based on borders between physical spaces, at least with respect
to the claim that Cyberspace should naturally be governed by territorially defined rules."); Katsh, supra note
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Freedom from distance related constraints may have interesting
implications for government. It may lead to the development of international
standards, much as the Industrial Revolution facilitated (and benefited from) the
rise of strong nation states. The efficiency arguments successfully applied to the
Commerce Clause for the past two centuries also lend support for not stopping the
legal convergence at the United States border. Clearly, this is the path of the
European Union.
Increased federal dominance is also certainly possible, in areas such as
education, taxation, and professional services such as law and medicine. 134 Each of
these activities can be partially performed online,' 35 and the federal government
may choose to exercise supremacy. Reducing the importance of distance may also
permit power to be further distributed to the states, as the location best suited for
the particular endeavor. With modern technology, the efficiency goal of national
uniformity could be met through an interconnected network of local actors.
C.

Technical Standards

Before moving on to examine the case studies, a brief discussion of
technical standards is appropriate. Technical standards, such as the HIPAA
administrative simplification rules, are an interesting form of health care regulation.
Technological advance produces certain items or services that, by their
essential nature, can best be provided through adoption of a standard, 1"6 even if the

128, at 1694 ("Electronic networks change how much time is needed to move and access information but it is
their impact on the dimension of distance, even more than on the time dimension, that may bring about the
most profound change. Computer networks allow much information that was previously inaccessible and
valueless because it was in a distant place, to become useflul and valuable when it is accessible via a network.
Similarly, people with whom one could only maintain a "distant" relationship can now become co-workers
who can efficiently interact with each other. As information that was previously isolated and separate is
shared and used as if it were in one place, and as people who were once separated communicate more often,
new relationships and new institutions are formed"); Nicholas Terry, Structuraland Legal Implications ofEHealth, 33 J. HEALTH L. 605 (2000).
133
WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF Brrs: SPACE, PLACE ANDTHE INFOBAHN (1995), quoted in Katsh,
supra note 128, at 1717.
134
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ended a century-old tradition of state regulation with federal
rules for local access. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366,371 (1999) ("Until the 1990s, local
phone service was thought to be a natural monopoly. States typically granted an exclusive franchise in each
local service area to a local exchange carrier (LEC), which owned, among other things, the local loops (wires
connecting telephones to switches), the switches (equipment directing calls to their destinations), and the
transport trunks (wires carrying calls between switches) that constitute a local exchange network.
Technological advances, however, have made competition among multiple providers of local service seem
possible, and Congress recently ended the longstanding regime of state-sanctioned monopolies.")
135
See Johnson, supra note 130, at 1377-78, 1382 (discussing an Intemet-based jurisdiction to
replace traditional local regulation patterns).
136
The Internet is a network of networks that operate on common technical standards, allowing free
transfer of information. Cell phones are able to roam on different networks due to the use of a common
technical standard. Television transmission and reception is possible due to the common standards for
frequency and signal strength.
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standard is itself arbitrary.13 7 Adoption of a standard does not necessarily freeze
innovation; technology may retain dynamic opportunities for improvement."
Standards may be public or proprietary, but proprietary standards are likely
to be less efficient. By their nature, competing standards require additional
consumer costs. 139 Furthermore, if a single proprietary standard becomes dominant
and is protected by intellectual property laws, the resulting market power may
allow monopolistic behavior. 14° By establishing reasonable public standards,
national efficiencies can be reaped. 141 As commerce continues to expand, the
argument for efficiency will call for the adoption of such standards, ultimately on
an international basis.
D.

Technology and Federalism:A Modest Conclusion

One should not draw a hasty conclusion from this analysis, other than to
say that hasty conclusions are often wrong; nevertheless, while technology may
have played a key role in the expansion of federal power in the first two centuries
of the Republic, we should not assume that the banner of technology, once
unfurled, will necessarily rally the troops to the federal side. Instead, the changing
nature of technology calls for a careful analysis of whether it has a positive,
negative or neutral impact on the federalism question at hand.
137

An example of an arbitrary - but necessary - standard is driving on the right (or left) side of the

road. Selection of one or the other standard produces no apparent benefit, so long as everyone on the road
adheres to the selected arbitrary standard. Another example of arbitrary standards are weights and measures,
which were discussed by counsel in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1824), as the type of legislation
requiring uniform national adoption, and which are federal powers granted under Article I. U.S. CONST., art.
I, § 8, cl. 5. An example of a non-arbitrary standard could be the twenty-four hour day.
138
Fifty years ago, certain services were regarded as natural monopolies that could only be delivered
through a single-owner system. Prominent examples would have been electrical and telephone utilities. See
AT&T Corp. v Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); id. at 402 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Technological
change has now permitted competition in the local delivery of electricity and telephone service. Just as the
description of natural monopolies has not remained static, one should not expect adopted standards to lead
inexorably to atrophy.
139

One example would be the VHS and Beta videotape systems, which for a time required
manufacturers to produce videotapes in both formats. After a period of competition, the VHS system
dominated the market and Beta tapes (and tape players) were relegated to history. Premature adoption of a
mandated standard has its own disadvantages; if a governmental mandate had required 8-Track as the sole
format for music then much of the consumer electronics innovations of the last thirty years might have been
lost.
This is one of the basic theories proffered by the government in UnitedStates v. Microsoft, 97 F.
140
Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) on appeal213 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

141
The most effective standards are not noticed in everyday life. Take for example the United States
standard for most consumer electrical devices. Devices for the U.S. market that are to operate on alternating
current invariably are designed for 110 to 120 volts, carried through a two or three prong plug which fits into
all consumer electrical outlets across the United States. The advantages of a single national standard are
obvious, particularly when one visits another country that operates on a different standard. Imagine the
difficulty if Indiana adopted the British style of prong, or 220 volts as standard; worse yet, if each state
Many other examples could be cited, including railroad gauges, time and
created its own standards.
calendars, music and video formats, the Internet, and cell phones. Competition can remain robust once the
open public standard is adopted.
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A.

TECHNOLOGY, REGULATION AND HEALTHCARE: CASE STUDIES

E-Health andState Based Licensure ofPhysicians

Technology is blurring the boundaries of the geographic fiefdoms that
have traditionally governed health care. The physician is no longer the exclusive
gatekeeper for clinical information. 4 2 Moving beyond telemedicine, e-health
promises (or threatens) to bring clinical interactions to the Internet, without regard
to distance or jurisdiction. 43 Surgical robots may permit world-renowned surgeons
to operate on a patient at any distance.'" Patients can maintain relationships with
physicians during travel or after relocations, or initiate relationships ex nihilo
across the country or across the world.14s E-health businesses are potentially subject
to the regulatory authority of many different jurisdictions.' 4 As e-health frees the
physician from a purely local practice, a major regulatory collision is imminent, as
Professor Nicholas Terry has observed:
This lack of physicality, the decoupling of physician from
jurisdiction-delimited practice, severely challenges state licensing
systems that apply to healthcare professionals. Telemedicine
statutes that have been passed in a few states may map to a narrow
range of business-to-business e-Health businesses. However, in
the case of most business-to-consumer e-Health models ... many
practitioners will be risking a charge of unlicensed practice of
medicine, while their patients may face an additional risk of
dealing with a physician without (typically geographically
limited) malpractice insurance coverage. Inevitably, as e-Health
142

See Bruce Merlin Fried, et al., E-Health: Technologic Revolution Meets Regulatory Constraint,

HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 124, 125 (health content provided online); Barry R. Furrow,
BroadcastingClinical Guidelines on the Internet: Will Physicians Tune In?, 25 Am. J.L. & MED. 403-21
(1999); Terry, supra note 132, at 608. See also the website of EBM Solutions, Inc. regarding providing peerreviewed clinical information to physicians and patients in parallel formats. See EBM Solutions, Inc.,
Evidence-BasedMedicine (visited on May 5, 2001) <http./www.webebm.com>.
143
See Jeff Goldsmith, The Internet and Managed Care: A New Wave of Innovation, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, Nov.Dec. 2000, at 42, 48-50 (discussing clinical uses of the Internet such as medical management

and decision support); Jerome P. Kassirer, Patients, Physicians, and the Internet, HEALTH AFFAIRS,
Nov./Dec. 2000, at 115; Silverman, supranote 7.
144

,See Cinda Becker, Look, No Hands: With Surgical Robotics, Industry Embraces Cutting-Edge
Technology, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Apr. 30, 2001, at 36-40,46.
145

See id.

148

See Fried et al., supra note 142, at 128-30; J.D. Kleinke, Vaporware.com: The FailedPromise of

the Health Care Internet, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov.Dec. 2000, at 57,63 (anti-referral and fraud and abuse laws
will hinder the development of intemet health care ventures); M. Kevin Outterson, Physicians, E Health and
Liability, Address Before the American Health Lawyers Association Physicians and Physician Organizations
Law Institute (April 19 & 20, 2001) (available at <http'//www.healthlawyers.org>); Stephen T. Parente,
Beyond the Hype: A Taxonomy ofE-Health Business Models, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov.Dec. 2000, at 89,97.
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expands, these issues will provide impetus for adoption of more
portable licensing requirements, increased reciprocity, and even
transnational qualifications.1 47
The present system is a welter of jurisdictions: federal, state, private
associations and local institutions. Federal regulation of health care is plenary
under the Commerce Clause and follows ubiquitous federal funds under the
Spending Power.1 48 The states have settled the disputes amongst the medical sects
and have reached consensus on what constitutes licensed medical practice. 149 The
Liaison Committee on Medical Education's national accreditation process
dominates medical education."S Training and licensure of both domestic and
international medical graduates is coordinated through the private National
Resident Matching Program.' 5 1 Peer review is still primarily conducted at the local
institutional level, or in Medicare-designated regional Peer Review Organizations,
each operating under various state'5 2 and federal statutes.l3 A recently announced
quality initiative by the Health Care Financing Administration may centralize many
elements of this process through national data analysis.' 4 While the peer review
committees meet locally, much of the key information is either sent to, or received
from the National Practitioner Data Bank, established under federal law to track
errant physicians nationwide.1es Parallel trade associational and private efforts also
147

Terry, supra note 132, at 607-08 (citations omitted). In addition to Professor Terry's comment on

malpractice insurance coverage, e-health raises questions about the applicable malpractice standard. If the
physician is in one state and the patient in another, which local standard of care should apply? Or more
fundamentally, should not the applicable standard be national - or international - rather than local?
148
149

See supranote 95.
See supra part II.

150

The Liaison Committee on Medical Education is a private organization selected by the American
Medical Association and the Association of American Medical Colleges. See Liaison Committee on Medical
Education (visited May 29,2001) <http:/Icme.org/overview.htm>.
151
See National Resident Matching Program (visited May 6, 2001) <http.//nrmp.aamc.orglnrmp/>.

For a review of the international medical graduate process for licensure in the U.S., see Saeid B. Amini,
DiscriminationofInternationalMedical GraduatePhysiciansBy ManagedCare Organizations:Impact, Law
andRemedy, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 461 (1999).
152

For a list of state peer review statutes, see Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical PeerReview: High

Cost But No Benefit - Is It Time For a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 58-60 (1999).
153
See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2001).
154
The Department of Health and Human Services recently formed a Patient Safety Task Force to
address medical errors. See DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PATIENT SAFETY TASK FORCE SHEET
(undated, cir. 2001) (copy on file); DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, RESEARCH IN HHS: PATIENT
SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEMS AND NATIONAL SUMMIT ON PATIENT SAFETY DATA COLLECTION AND USE

(Apr. 23, 2001) (copy on file).
155
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11137 (2000). This information includes malpractice judgments,
settlement payments, disciplinary actions, and license suspensions. A second federal effort is the Healthcare
Integrity and Protection Data Bank. See DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PROGRAM MEMORANDUM
AB-01-57 (Apr. 24,2001).
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In the nineteenth century, local control of credentialing made eminent
sense: the local physicians were in the best position to judge the quality of the
physician and the harm to patients occurred locally. Today, with technology such
as the National Practitioner Data Bank, the utility of state peer review and licensure
systems is open to challenge as duplicative and unnecessary. However, instead of
requiring a federal assumption of the system, the national databases may improve
the effectiveness of the various state medical boards by lowering their information
costs and blocking itinerant rouge physicians. In this fashion, technology may
improve the effectiveness of the current "system", blunting calls for federal reform,
particularly if state medical boards make liberal provision for interstate practice of
e-health.) With the reduced cost of information, and the potential gains from ehealth, states should rely more on the national databases, as well as comity, in
permitting cross border practice.
B.

Health CarePrivacy

The rise of electronic databases and communications technology has raised
fears of invasions of health care privacyYS When medical records were only
physical, and stored at the physician's office, any invasion of privacy was local and
sporadic.15 9 As technology permitted the electronic transmission of health claims
and clinical information, it became possible to exploit privacy on a national and
systematic basis, often with pecuniary motives. Much ink (and some blood) has
been spilled in the health care policy journals during the past decade on the issue of
privacy."5 With the adoption of the administrative simplification and privacy rules
Various trade associations offer data bases, such as the Federation of State Medical Boards
Physician Data Center, which offers a public database (availableat <http.//www.docinfo.org>) on 115,000
state medical board actions taken against 35,000 physicians. See Federation of State Medical Boards,
Welcome to FSMB Online (visited May 6, 2001) <httpJ/www.fsmb.org/new.htm>. For an example of a
private service, see Healthgrades.com (visited May 6, 2001y<http//www.heathgrades.com>.
For an attempt to begin the coordinated regulation of e-health, see JOrNT COMMISSION ON
157
ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, REVISIONS TO SELECTED MEDICAL STAFF STANDARDS:
COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, MS.5.16 (eff. Jan. 1,2001) (copy on file).
ISO
See generally Sharon J. Hussong, Medical Records and Your Privacy: Developing Federal
Legislationto ProtectPatientPrivacyRights, 26 AM. J.L & MED. 453 (2000).
159
Such as the break in and theft of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatric records by the White House
"plumbers" unit on September 3, 1971.
156

160
Even a brief survey will strain the patience of devoted policy wonks. See, e.g., HEALTH DATA IN
THE INFORMATION AGE: USE, DISCLOSURE, AND PRIVACY (M.S. Donaldson & K.N. Lohr, eds., 1994);
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PROTECTING PRIVACY INCOMPUTERIZED MEDICAL INFORMATION
(OTA-TCT-576, 1993); L.O. Gostin, et al., Privacy andSecurity of PersonalInformation in a New Health
Care System, 270 JAMA 2487 (1993); Jon F. Merz, et al., Hospital Consent for Disclosure of Medical
Records,26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 241 (1998); Michael C. Roach, HIPAA Privacy: "IndividualRights" andthe
"Minimum Necessary" Requirements, 33 J. HEALTH L. 549 (2000); Mark A. Rothstein, et al., Protecting
Genetic Privacy By Permitting Employer Access Only To Job-Related Employee Medical Information:
Analysis of a Unique Minnesota Law, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 399 (1998); Symposium, Medical Record
Confidentiality and Data Collection, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85-138 (1997) (five symposium articles on
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of HIPAA,' 6' and subsequent congressional inaction, the Department of Health and
Human Services was authorized to promulgate regulations protecting the privacy of
individually identifiable health information. 162 The Final Privacy Rule has now
been issued, 1"a although any hopes for "finality" are likely to be dashed as vast
armies of lobbyists maneuver to modify the rules before implementation."M
The Final Privacy Rule reaches all "individually identifiable health
information" in the United States, whether in an electronic format or not."s It is not
limited to records created under federally reimbursed programs, and therefore
Congress' power to enact the privacy rule does not proceed from the Spending
Power. The source must be the Commerce Clause, or perhaps, a constitutional right
to privacy.
As a power under the Commerce Clause, the scope of the Final Privacy
Rule in terms of federalism is remarkable. The rule clearly applies federal privacy
regulation to items such as the handwritten notes of a psychiatrist seeing a private
pay patient on a cash basis, both being life long residents of a single state. If
challenged under the Constitution, the Final Privacy Rule must be defended on the
basis that such notes are articles of interstate commerce, or affect interstate
commerce in a substantial way.166
On the other hand, the Final Privacy Rule does not preempt state laws that
impose more stringent privacy rules. 6 ' Congress mandated this approach in
HIPAA.168 Perhaps this is an example of Wechsler's political federalism in
action. 169 However, this HIPAA anti-preemption rule has recently been challenged

medical record confidentiality).
161
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
2021 (1996) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1320d-8 (2001)).
Congress gave itself a deadline of August 20, 1999 to craft its own privacy rules; failing that
162
deadline, the Health Care Financing Administration was instructed to promulgate its own rules by February
20, 2000. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 264 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1320d-3).
16
See HIPAA Final Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101-160.312 (2001).
164

See Jeff Tieman, Privacy Surprise: Bush Backs Tough Medical-Data Standards, MODERN

HEALTHCARE, Apr. 16, 2001, at4, 16.

165
Compare HIPAA Proposed Privacy Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 60,053 (Nov. 3, 1999) previously
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.504 (definition of "protected health information") with HIPAA Final Privacy
Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001) (definition of "protected health information") to trace the expansion of the
HIPAA privacy rule from merely electronic health records to virtually all health records.
16
This standard may not be hard to meet. See Wickard v. Filbur, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding
the federal power to regulate production of wheat for on farm use and personal consumption due to the effect
on interstate commerce).
167
See HIPAA Final Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.201 - 160.205 (2001).
16
169

See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7 (2001).
See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the

Composition andSelection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954), cited in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 n. 11 (1985) (Blackmun, J.).
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as a violation of the negative Commerce Clause.170
C.

PortabilityofNurse Licensure

News reports warn that the United States is entering a period of shortage of
registered nurses, 171 particularly due to the aging of the nursing workforce. 72 The
distribution of registered nurses is not uniform across the country, varying greatly
from state to state. 173 To the extent that quality of care is dependent upon the
availability of nursing care," a more efficient distribution of nurses between the
states may improve health status.
The primary regulatory barrier to the free mobility of registered nurses is
state licensure. If one can assume that the average nurse in a high ratio state, such
as Massachusetts, is generally as well trained as the average nurse in a low ratio
state, such as Texas, then it follows that free mobility of nurses from an area of
relative surplus to an area of relative shortage would improve the overall delivery
See Quintiles Transnational Corp. v. WebMD Corp., No. 5:01-CV-180-B0(3) (E.D.N.C. Mar. 2,
2001) (in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction, the District Court said that health information
may be an article of commerce, citing Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), and state laws cannot attach to
such health information once the data leaves the state); Reece Hirsch, The Not-So-Dormant Commerce
Clause: Implications of the Quintiles-WebMD Casefor HIPAA Preemption, 10 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 765
(May 10, 2001). For a First Circuit opinion rejecting a dormant Commerce Clause attack on Maine's
prescription drug plan, see PharmaceuticalResearch andManufacturers ofAmerica v. Concannon, No. 002446,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 9324 (1st Cir. May 16,2001).
171
See, e.g., Roni Rabin & Carol Eisenberg, Experts PostAlert on Nurse Shortage;Serious Situation
Predicted Within Decade, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 2001, available at <httpJ/www.chicagotribune.com>; Luke
Shockman, Area HospitalsMay Look Overseas to Fight Nursing Shortage, TOLEDO BLADE, Apr. 11, 2001,
available at <http'/toledoblade.com>; Phoebe Zerwick, Nursing A Shortage: Trained Nurses From
Phllipplnes Help Fill a Void at Baptist, WINSTON-SALEM J., Mar. 28, 2001, available at
<http.//www.journalnow.com>. Local perceptions of shortage may be flawed, since each of these states
(Illinois, Ohio and North Carolina) already employ registered nurses at rates that exceed the national average.
170

See BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, THE REGISTERED NURSE POPULATION: THE NATIONAL SAMPLE
SURVEY OF REGISTERED NURSES MARCH 2000: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 10-11 (2001).

172
See Peter L Buerhaus et al., Implications of an Aging Registered Nurse Workforce, 283 JAMA
2948 (2000); Peter I. Buerhaus & Douglas 0. Staiger, Trouble in the Nurse Labor Market? Recent Trends
and FutureOutlook, HEALTH AFFAIRS, JanJFeb. 1999, at 214.

173

For example, the national average, the top four and bottom four states:

Employed nurses per 100,000 population
National Average
782
District of Columbia 1,675
Massachusetts
1,194
South Dakota
1,128
Rhode Island
1,101
Nevada
520
California
544
Utah
592
Texas
606
BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, supranote 171, at 10-11.
174
See JACK NEEDLEMAN, ET AL., HEALTH RESOURCES SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, NURSE
STAFFING AND

PATIENT OUTCOMES

IN HOSPITALS

130-34

(2001)

(visited

Apr.

30,

2001)

<http:f/bhpr.hrsa.gov/dn/staffstudy.htm> (finding a positive correlation between patient outcomes potentially
sensitive to nursing (OPSNs) and nurse staffing in acute care hospital inpatient units).
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17 5

Various states have responded to the .impact of telecommunications
technology and physical mobility176 by reducing the regulatory barrier of state
licensure through the adoption of the Interstate Nurse Licensure Compact, whereby
states adopting the compact recognize the licensure of nurses from other compact
states.1lr The first state to ratify the Compact was Maryland, effective July 1, 1999,
followed to date by thirteen other states. 78 States signing the Compact facilitate the
freer importation and exportation of nursing labor, since the nursing license
becomes more portable. This effect becomes particularly powerful as the number of
Compact states
increases, geometrically increasing the number of possible
79
relocations.
175

This hypothesis may be valid so long as one establishes a positive correlation between staffing
levels of registered nurses and improved health status. However, the most populous of the states with low
nurse employment ratios, California, boasts above average health status indicators in categories such as
percentage of mothers receiving prenatal care, infant mortality, percentage of infants of low birth weight, and
incidence of death from cancer and heart disease. BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS NATIONAL CENTER FOR
HEALTH WORKFORCE INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS,

HRSA STATE HEALTH WORKFORCE PROFILES-

CALIFORNIA 3 (Dep't Health & Human Serv., Dec. 2000). Another large state with low nurse employment
ratios, Texas, posted results near the national average. BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS NATIONAL CENTER
FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS, HRSA STATE HEALTH WORKFORCE PROFILESTEXAS 3 (Dep't Health & Human Serv., Dec. 2000). The region with the highest reported nurse employment
ratio, the District of Columbia, reported health outcomes that fall far below national norms. BUREAU OF
HEALTH PROFESSIONS NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS, HRSA

STATE HEALTH WORKFORCE PROFILES-DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 3 (Dep't Health & Human Serv., Dec. 2000).
One could argue that this result invalidates the correlation between high nursing staffing levels and improved
health status. A more likely explanation is that other environmental factors, such as poverty, violence, and
pre-existing health status, drives the health status indicators for the District of Columbia and that the high
levels of nursing employment there reflect the heightened demand for health care services in a distressed
region. See NEEDLEMAN, supra note 174. This position will also lead one to question whether the current
distribution patterns of registered nurses actually reflects inefficiency caused by internal barriers to the free
flow of labor. An alternative hypothesis is that nursing labor is thereby deployed to the regions of greatest
need.
176
Article 1(a) of the Nurse Licensure Compact explicitly recognizes the impact of mobility and
technology in rendering traditional state-based regulation inefficient: "The party states find that: ... 3. the
expanded mobility of nurses and the use of advanced communication technologies as part of our nation's
healthcare delivery system require greater coordination and cooperation among states in the areas of nurse
licensure and regulation; 4. new practice modalities and technology make compliance with individual state
nurse licensure laws difficult and complex; 5. the current system of duplicative licensure for nurses
practicing in multiple states is cumbersome and redundant to both nurses and states." National Council of
State Board of Nursing, Nurse Licensure Compact (Nov. 6, 1998) <http://www.nrsbn.org/files/mutual/
compactasp>.
177
As of April 2001, fourteen states have adopted the Nurse Licensure Compact, including Arkansas,
Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin. See National Council of State Board of Nursing, State Compact Bill
Status (last modified Apr. 17, 2001) <http'/www.ncsbn.org/files/mutual/billstatus.asp>. Interstate compacts
require Congressional approval under Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 ofthe U.S. Constitution.
178
See National Council of State Board of Nursing, State Compact Bill Status (visited April 25, 2001)
<http://www.ncsbn.org/files/mutual/billstatus.asp>.
179
If only one state belongs to the Compact, the utility of the legislation is zero, since no one may
benefit from the licensure portability. When the second state joins, residents of both states now have the
option of mobility to the other. When the Compact is composed of five states, the number of possible
relocations is twenty, and if one considers the possibility of e-health in five states, the number of possible
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The Compact may also permit nurses not currently employed in nursing to
more easily re-enter the nursing workforce even though they have moved from their
state of licensure.1 8 A review of the states that have joined the Compact yields no
181
easy correlations: Compact states may be found in the Intermountain West, the
Midwest, 82 the South, 83 and the Atlantic Coast.1" Some of these states have low
nursing employment ratios," suggestive of a need to import nursing labor, while
others lead the nation in high nursing employment ratios."
Compact federalism 8 7 enjoys some features that are more powerful than
model law federalism." The goal of uniformity" under model laws is thwarted in
at least three ways. First, states exhibit an inevitable tendency to improvise local
variations rather than enact truly uniform legislation. 90 Model legislation, at its
best, yields parallel systems. 191 Second, divergent administrative practices between
virtual relocations exceeds factorial five.
In 2000, an estimated 466,235 licensed registered nurses were not currently employed in nursing,
180
representing 17.3% of the total. See BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, supra note 171, at 1-2. While many
factors probably account for the decision to leave nursing despite predictions of a national shortage, becoming
licensed in a new state can be a significant impediment to remaining in nursing or rejoining the profession
after a geographic move.
Idaho and Utah.
181
182

North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa and Wisconsin.

183

Texas, Arkansas and Mississippi.

184

Maine, Delaware, Maryland and North Carolina.
Such as Texas. See supranote 154.

185

North Dakot, South Dakota, Maine and Iowa each exceed 1,000 employed nurses per 100,000
population, as compared to the national average of 782. See BUREAU OF HEALTH PROFESSIONS, supra note
171, at 10-11.
By this term I mean the process of adopting legislation that is dependent upon similar action by
187
other states in order to achieve the desired legislative result. Additional examples would include the Model
Interstate Tax Compact and to some extent state insurance legislation on the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners model such as retaliatory taxes and interstate administration of insolvent insurance
companies. Multilateral treaties are a common example in the international sphere. Perhaps the Framers
recognized the inherent power in interstate compacts when they drafted Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the
U.S. Constitution, which requires Congressional approval for any state to "enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State."
By this term I mean the work of various commissions on uniform state laws. The Uniform
188
186

Commercial Code is a prominent example.
Uniformity is a goal to the extent one values predictability and lowering the information costs to
189
market participants concerning regulation.
In model law federalism, the individual state cost of divergence from the model is low, absent an
190
enforcement mechanism, which permits states to substitute local judgment for the model policy. The
aggregation of these local variations threatens the efficiency goals of uniformity. By contrast, compact
federalism requires near perfect adherence as the price of admission, preserving the goal of reducing
regulatory barriers to free mobility.
State variations in the Uniform Commercial Code are examples. Professors Mashaw and Marmor
191
have suggested that federalism can play a constructive role in the development of health care policy,
especially ifa political impasse has blocked national reforms. See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 95, at 115.
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the states also threaten to upset the goals of uniformity.192 Finally, many model
laws suffer from tepid acceptance and may languish with only a few states in
conformity." To return to the current example of nurse licensure, model laws at
their best would merely allow a nurse to apply to be licensed in a new state,
confident that the education which was sufficient in the current state would be
acceptable for licensure at the same level in the new state.'9 Compact federalism
operates on a different level: anyone with a valid license in any member state is
automatically permitted to practice in any other member state. Furthermore, states
have a powerful incentive to join and conformity is self-policing. This power
inherent in a reciprocity agreement may violate the negative Commerce Clause.'95
D.

Medical ErrorReporting

Correction of medical errors is one key to improving the quality of health
care.1'9 In order to improve patient care systems, data on errors must be collected
and analyzed to identify the root causes.197 The National Practitioner Data Bank
They celebrate the variation likely to emerge from this decentralized approach: "Ifchange is to be workable
and acceptable, it must take account of the real differences between New York and Idaho, Wisconsin and
Louisiana," a sentiment certainly shared by the local bar. Id. at 116. They argue that states do well to make
different policy choices concerning coverage and health policy. See id. While their position may have appeal
in the context of health care reform, it enjoys less force in this discussion of licensure (which is admittedly
beyond the scope of their article). What policy reasons can be marshaled today to support a nurse or
physician licensure standard, or clinical standards of care, in New York that are significantly different from
Idaho, Wisconsin or Louisiana?
192
Divergent administrative rules and practices increase the information cost. The National
Association of Insurance Commissioners provides a Model Regulation Service to attempt to standardize
administrative procedures amongst the states. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS,
MODEL LAws, REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE (2000).
193
For example, the NAIC Model HMO Act is an important priority, and yet only 30 states have
enacted it without substantial modifications. See id. at 430-36 (Vol. 2, 1997).
194
One concern voiced about interstate competition is the "race to the bottom", wherein states will
lower standards (or taxes) below optimum levels in an effort to compete with the other states for business.
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1437 (1992) (interstate competition in corporation law); Michael K.
Outterson, Taxation Without Premeditation: An Economic Analysis of the Structure, Regulation and
Strangulationof the Private Activity Bond Market, 6 B.U.J. TAx L. 1 (1988) (interstate competition for
industrial development through location incentives, namely the tax-favored private activity bond). Compact
federalism, by contrast, creates a "race to the middle," by rewarding states which join the consensual standard
of quality. As more states join the particular compact, the cost of exclusion from the compact to states at the
top or the bottom of any given issues are increased.
195
See New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274-75 (1988) (holding that a
reciprocity provision in an otherwise discriminatory law favoring locally produced ethnol did not absolve a
violation of the negative Commerce Clause. Reciprocity added additional power to the discriminatory effect
of the ethanol tax abatement. Reciprocity is constitutionally permissible only when the underlying regulation
is not discriminatory in its own right).
195

See INSTITUTES OF MEDICINE, TO ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T.

Kohn, et al., eds. 1999) (estimating that medical errors lead to 44,000 to 98,000 patient deaths per year in the
United States).
197
Harold Bressler, The Sentinel Event Policy: A Response By the Joint Commission, 33 J. HEALTH
L. 519, 522-23 (2000) (defending the Joint Commission's Sentinel Event Reporting Policy and describing the
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reporting systems have been described earlier in this article.190 State standards for
medical error reporting have also been effectively standardized through private
accreditation agencies such as the Joint Commission.1 " The benefits of root cause
analysis on a consistent national data platform are not suspended at state political
boundaries, arguing for a single data reporting process and response structure for
medical errors.
In nursing, the National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN)
maintains its own error reporting service, the Disciplinary Data Bank, which
contains information provided by the various state boards of nursing.2 The
NCSBN recommends that the state boards of nursing have access to the various
national reporting data bases in order to effectively discipline wayward nurses:
Absent individual accountability standards, practitioners that leave
organizations after serious errors occur and are employed
elsewhere will never receive necessary remediation or education
to address human factors, thus compromising the safety of the
patient. 1
This testimony actually supports the abolition of divergent state licensure
standards, since a national standard relying upon a single credentialing data base
would advance the stated goals more effectively and efficiently, even if
administered through state boards or agencies.
E.

InternetPharmacies

Internet pharmacies (such as Drugstore.com or Walgreens.com) accept
prescriptions over the Internet and generally deliver the products via package
express such as UPS or Federal Express.2°2 Although located in a single state,
Internet pharmacies are potentially subject to the licensing jurisdiction of state
boards of pharmacy in each of the 50 states, depending upon the location of the

use of the data by the reporting institutions to perform root cause analyses to change systems and prevent

errors). Disparate sources of data are also collected and analyzed by other organizations at the national level,
such as the Agency for Health Research and Quality, the Centers for Disease Control, and the Food and Drug
Administration. For a critique of the inadequacies of the National Practitioner Data Bank, see Robert Pear,
Incompetent Physicians are Rarely Reported as Law Requires, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2001, available at

<http://nytimes.com>.
198

See supranotes 155-56.

199

See Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Facts About PatientSafety

(visited May 2,2001) <http'J/www.jcaho.orgtsentinel.safety.html>.
200

See NATIONAL SUMMIT ON MEDICAL ERRORS AND PATIENT SAFETY RESEARCH: HEARING

BEFORE THE QUALITY INTERAGENCY COORDINATION TASK FORCE 13-14 (undated, cir. 2000) (statement of

Joey Ridenour, Board President, The National Council of State Boards ofNursing, Inc.).
201

Id at 3.

2M

See Outterson,supra note 146, at 18.
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customer. 3 Retailers like Walgreens had licenses in various states where they had
physical stores, which simplified the regulatory process for expanding onto
Internet. 04
A proponent of federal control would argue that this 50 state pharmacy
regulation system was inefficient, since Internet-only pharmacies were forced to
duplicate its regulatory filings throughout the nation. Despite the hardship, several
Internet-only pharmacies were able to achieve regulatory compliance, partially due
to a streamlined process devised by the National Association of Boards of
Pharmacy. 0 3
In addition to legitimate vendors such as Drugstore.com, some Internet
websites offer prescription drugs without a prescription, or with an online medical
evaluation of doubtful usefulness. 2 o3 These sites pose unique enforcement
challenges, exploiting the distributed pattern of authority in federalism?. 7 The
ultimate government response was a coordinated private, state and federal
certification for the legitimate sites, and parallel enforcement against the illegal
ones.20 While this response must be considered a work in progress, given the
incredible technical challenge posed by the Internet, the regulators responded to the
change in technology and performed admirably, without fundamentally altering the
state-federal balance.
F.

ERISA Preemption

One goal of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19742m was
to permit multi-state employers to offer a single retirement and health insurance
benefit nationwide, without myriad permutations under state and local law. By
preempting state law, ERISA allows a plan to offer a more administrable benefit
design.210 Administrative complexity (or impossibility) was viewed as an undue
burden on interstate commerce.
The advance of technology now makes it possible to remove the portion of
the ERISA preemption that was predicated on reducing administrative complexity.
Unlike 1974, contemporary human resource software can track many different

203

See id. at 19, 21-22.

204

See id.

205

See id, at 23-24.

205

See id. at 18.

207

See id. at 19.

208

See id. at 18-24.

209

Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2000).

210

See Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The Case

for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251 (1997); see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 99-100 (1989); Nichols, supra note 117, at 28-29.
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benefit plans across multiple jurisdictions.2 1' While it may once have been true that
complexity required a single federal solution, in the ERISA context, Congress may
have the freedom to return power over benefit design and other similar issues to the
states. Technology may facilitate similar opportunities for federalism in taxation.212
G.

Genomics

If any area of health care technology calls for international regulation, it is
genetically modified organisms. Modifications to food product germlines may
escape into the environment or contaminate unrelated crops,213 with unknown
consequences. Genetically modified soybeans account for about half of the
soybeans grown in the United States in 2000.214 The release of genetically modified
salmon may be imminent, 215 and yet there are serious questions to be answered:
One hypothetical area for regulation is illustrated here: you may
have seen pictures of these salmon on the front page of the New
York Times a few days ago [May 2000]. Some of these may be
more inspiring to fisherman [sic] than to others. This salmon on
the right carries a transgene, an extra gene in its germline that
expresses a growth hormone from another fish. At 14 months of
size, the wild-type salmon and the transgenic salmon are
remarkably different in size, although their ultimate size is about
the same. Some people wonder what would happen if these fish
were to escape into the vast seas - could their presence change
population dynamics? Others are concerned that these fish might
be dangerous to eat, although there is no evidence for that.
The story raises some interesting questions about what we
should do. Should we just let this happen? Should we have some
kind of penalty for companies that raise such fish if damages
occur? Should we ask the FDA to prove that these fish are safe to
eat? Should we require that these fish be tagged so that if a tagged
fish is found in the open seas the company that grew it can be
penalized? Or perhaps, least likely of all, should we prevent the

211

See,

e.g.,

PeopleSoft

Inc.,

HRMS

Product Brochure

(visited

May

7,

2001)

<http'//www.peoplesoftcom/en/us/virtuallibrary> (copy on file with author).
See Shaviro, supra note 122, at 921 (1992) (discussion of administrative costs of interstate
212
divergence in tax rules).
See Andrew Pollack, Farmers JoiningState Efforts Against Bioengineered Crops, N.Y. TiMES,
213
Mar. 24,2001, availableat <http://www.nytimes.comt2001/03/24/health/24DAKO.html>.
See id.
214
215

See Andrew Pollack, Moratorium on Alterationof Salmon, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,2001, available at

<http:/www.nytimes.comt2OOl/05/09/scienceO9FISH.html>.
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2 16
use of Federal funding for research on these fish?

Once the germline of wild salmon are altered by an accidental release
anywhere in the world, the change may be irreversible. In this situation, some have
called for a "Treaty to Protect the Genetic Common, 217 and in 2000 the World
Trade Organization adopted a "Biosafety Protocol," taking the first steps towards
international regulation of genetically modified organisms. 218 In the absence of
federal law, the states are rushing to fill the void.2 19 One could conceive of a
Commerce Clause challenge to many of these proposed state laws, along the lines
of Dean Milk Co.220 More practically, since any genetic modification anywhere has
the potential to spread globally, mere state (or national) regulation seems foolhardy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some tentative conclusions may be drawn from this study of the
interaction between health care, technology and federalism. First, describing health
care as a police power may have more to do with the historical practice of medicine
as a local art than any inherent definition of the phrase. The advance of technology,
first with scientific medicine and the automobile, and today with the Internet,
weakens the presumption that there is something uniquely local about health care,
although in most cases, care is still delivered locally.
Second, technological growth has supported an expansion of federal
power, both in the Commerce Clause and in the Spending Power. Technology has
traditionally permitted proponents of an expansive Commerce Clause to identify a
relationship to interstate and foreign commerce that permits federal regulation.
Technology's gift to the Spending Power probably lies in the ability of the federal
government to collect significant taxes that are not limited to import duties. These
funds, in turn, are distributed with conditions embodying the policy choices of
Congress.
Neither of these first two conclusions requires the abandonment of state
regulation of health care. With regard to the police power, the presumption may be
weakened, and yet there may be compelling policy reasons to retain state or

216

Harold E. Varmus, M.D., The Challenge of Making Laws on the Shifting Terrain of Science, 28

J.L. MED. & ETHICS 46, 47-48 (2000) (Selected Proceedings of "Genes and Society: Impact of New
Technologies on Law, Medicine, and Policy," May 10-12, 2000).
217
America's Next
Ethical War,
ECONOMIST,
Apr.
12,
2001,
available at

<http//www.economist.com/sciencedisplayStory.cfm?Story_ID=568825>
Rifkin).
218

Caution

Needed,

ECONOMIST,

Feb.

3,

(citing the efforts of Jeremy
2000,

available

at

<http://www.economist.com?PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=279360&approval=3804712993404>.
219

See Pollack, supra note 213 (more than 40 state bills to regulate genetically modified organisms

have been introduced this year).
220

See supranote 5.
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concurrent jurisdiction. While technology may have fueled the growth of federal
power, technology can cut both ways.22 Technology may provide enhanced
opportunities to distribute responsibility back to the states, or to exercise it more
efficiently in situ.
Third, the fact that states retain any authority at all in the face of nearomnipotent federal power may suggest that Wechsler's political federalism is
functioning. Of course, this statement is merely descriptive rather than normative,
and, if accepted, effectively abandons the field from constitutional review.
Fourth, one gets the sense when reading the new federalism cases and
literature that the court is probing for limits on federal power. To the extent that the
Tenth or Eleventh Amendments are successfully invoked, the states may gain some
power over health care regulation that is now held by the federal government,
although this project faces formidable opponents. Without giving short shrift to the
power of the Commerce Clause, the Spending Power is the true Goliath, due to the
federal financial role in health care.
Finally, it seems to me that one critical juncture in the history of health
care jurisprudence before the court was the SlaughterHouse Cases." While it may
be important for states to have rights in health care matters, it is perhaps more
important for individuals to have rights in this intensely personal area. 2 3 In the
Slaughter House Cases, a majority of the court did not find a violation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, on technical
grounds relating to the definition of citizenship.22 4 If that decision were revisited,
perhaps a David could be found to champion individual health care rights in the
face of plenary federal power. 22 5

See E. David Elliott, Symposium on Biomedical Technology and Health Care: Social and
Conceptual Transformations: Comments: Against Ludditism: An Essay on the Perils of the (Mls.)Use of
HlstoricalAnalogiesin Technology Assessment, 65 S. CAL. L.R. 279(1991).
83 U.S. (Wall.) 36 (1872); see also supranote 56.
2
221

A few recent cases involving personal liberty in health care matters have reached the Court
without analysis under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 121 S.Ct. 1352 (2001) (cannabis cooperative established
under California law to provide for the medical needs of its citizens ruled illegal); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding civil commitment of predatory child sexual offender; see supra note 22);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (no Constitutional right to die; see supra notes 125-26). Of
these cases, Glucksberg is more supportive of personal liberty - and federalism - since persons desiring
assisted suicide may relocate from Washington to Oregon. But this freedom in Glucksberg is endangered by
the Supremacy Clause should Congress decide to outlaw assisted suicide, much as Congress foreclosed the
medical use of cannabis in Oakland CannabisBuyers' Cooperative.
224
83 U.S. (Wall.) 36.
223

Most of the articles cited supra at note 56 are attempts to limit or channel the possible expansion
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
225
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